This is what started it all:
The board was discussing what judges look for in prospective judicial clerks:
CTA7:
You are missing the point. Many judges want to hire clerks who share their judicial philosophy, this certainly makes a difference in how smooth a chambers operates. Membership in the FS is a means by which to identify candidates who share that judge's philosophy.
Furthermore, I disagree that "95% of the issues are pretty clear cut." They would be if judges stuck to the plain meaning of statutes and regs, but many of them run off to the land of legislative history to manufacture the result they want.
Joe Sanguine:
(responding to my statement that "[t]hey would be if judges stuck to the plain meaning of statutes and regs, but many of them run off to the land of legislative history to manufacture the result they want")
See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, Seminole Tribe, etc. Oh, wait--the FS supports the results in those cases??? So much for "plain meaning," eh?
CTA7:
I am not going to debate someone who equates reading the Constitution in pari materia and in its historical context with resorting to legislative history to decide a case. That argument is beyond pathetic. You are smart enough to know that but obviously don't care.
Joe Sanguine:
Ah, the past couple of weeks have certainly been something, haven't they?
I learned a lot about the right wingers on the board a couple of weeks ago when cta7 posted the following:
"I am not going to debate someone who equates reading the Constitution in pari materia and in its historical context with resorting to legislative history to decide a case. That argument is beyond pathetic. You are smart enough to know that but obviously don't care."
I've been a little to busy to properly respond but the recent snowfall has disrupted my deposition schedule and given me some breathing space. So, to cta7:
"beyond pathetic"? Good grief. Let's see -- both "historical context" -- i.e., "original understanding" or "original intent" -- and "resorting to legislative history" are interpretive techniques whereby the interpreter goes beyond the plain meaning of the text to arrive at its operative meaning. They differ only in where beyond the text the interpreter looks. And while that difference may render one "better" or "more legitimate" than the other -- a point on which I express no opinion in this post -- that difference is insignificant when one considers the primary drawback of both approaches: it allows the interpreter to pick and choose among alleged sources of meaning until he finds something that supports a meaning he wishes the text to have.
Now, you might disagree with the previous paragraph. But "beyond pathetic"? To paraphrase Jeff Foxworthy -- "If you can't tell the difference between a position you disagree with and a position that's ridiculous, you might be an ideologue."
And as for the rest of the usual suspects who let this nonsense slide by: If you pick every nit with an argument for a position you disagree with but give a pass to the most egregious overstatements you do agree with, you might be an ideologue.
CTA7:
Joe-
I too have been busy. This is the first time that I've seen this post, and I will be happy to respond.
First, I stand by my statement.
Second, originalism is not an "interpretive technique[] whereby the interpreter goes beyond the plain meaning of the text to arrive at its operative meaning." This presumes that when the founders drafted, and the states ratified, the Constitution, they did so without regard to historical context. Read Ferrand's notes on the Constitutional Convention and Elliot's debates (covering the state ratification conventions), and you'll see that the vast majority of the Constitution's text is deeply rooted in history. Indeed, there are many terms of art in the Constitution that have hundreds of years of common law history behind them. It is this history that provides the objective parameters by which most constitutional questions can be resolved. The framers/states intended for this history to be taken into account when they wrote/ratified the Constitution. Thus, unlike modern day legislative history, the history underpinning the Constitution is the law.
Now, I agree that it is possible for someone to quote historical documents out of context--Jefferson's "Wall of Separation" letter to the N.C. baptist church is a perfect example. But when this occurs, another judge or scholar can call that person out and expose them for what the are, a fraud.
So, tell me again why it isn't beyond pathetic to compare reading the Constitution in pari materia and in its historical context with modern day legislative history.
Joe Sanguine:
Let's parse this out.
You begin with: "Originalism is not an 'interpretive technique[] whereby the interpreter goes beyond the plain meaning of the text to arrive at its operative meaning.'"
You then continue: "This presumes that when the founders drafted, and the states ratified, the Constitution, they did so without regard to historical context. Read Ferrand's notes on the Constitutional Convention and Elliot's debates (covering the state ratification conventions), and you'll see that the vast majority of the Constitution's text is deeply rooted in history." These statements do not support you thesis that originalism is not an interpretive technique whereby the interpreter goes beyond the plain meaning of the text to arrive at its operative meaning. To the contrary, they are a purported justification for exactly the sort of "going beyond" that I am talking about.
Even as such, your argument ultimately comes down to: "The framers/states INTENDED for this history to be taken into account when they wrote/ratified the Constitution." (my emphasis) And you derive this intent not from the text of the Constitution itself, but rather from the very sources you wish to use to "interpret" it. This is essentially the exercise undertaken by those resorting to legislative history to interpret a statute.
I could continue by comparing cases in which so-called "originalism" has been used to those in which legislative history has been uses to illustrate the similarity of the analyses, but that's beyond the point here. The point here is whether my comparison of the two techniques is "beyond pathetic." When you first used those words I simply assumed that you had let your emotions get the better of you. Now that I see that my assumption was mistaken (since you are "standing by" your statement weeks later) I'll let this series of posts stand and let readers draw their own conclusions regarding both the frivolousness of my comparison and your intellectual objectivity. The last word is yours.
CTA7:
Joe-
The "plain meaning" of the Constitution's text cannot be divorced from its historical underpinnings. Thus, while it is true that a judge must look to sources beyond the text to explain the text's meaning, that is not the same thing as "going beyond" the plain meaning of the text. The plain meaning of the text, to mean anything, must include the history that brought about its ratification. The text and history are one in the same, and together they comprise the law that is our Constitution.
Collateral Gestapo:
CTA7, anyone who spends their time arguing what Jefferson meant by his reference to a wall of separation is hopelessly lost. The question is whether we (read: USSC) want a wall of separation and, if so, whether the Constitution may be read to provide one. It is interesting what Jefferson may or may not have meant---a matter of historical interest. It is largely irrelevant to and certainly not a necessary element of Constitutional analysis.
Here's a hypo for you. Every legal historian of every political stripe agrees that the discovery of a critical document irrefutably demonstrates that the "framers" (will the real framers please stand up?) used the term "speech" in the 1stA to mean oral political advocacy and absolutely nothing else. Can Congress now ban Gabriel Garcia Marquez b/c they don't like the political implications of his fabulously written novels? Can I be jailed for praising his literary genius? Your resort to history for the "objective parameters" of Constitutional law could lead to no other conclusion. I hope for all our sakes that no one thinks so, and that somehow I've misunderstood you. I'm curious to find out. My Constitution would never allow someone to be jailed for praising a given author, and what Madison, Jefferson, or anyone else in the late-18th century may have thought couldn't matter less to me in that respect.
CTA7:
CG-
I don't think it is relevant whether we want a WOS, the sole question is whether the Constitution supports the Court's modern day establishment clause jurisprudence (1947-).
As for your hypo, I disagree that, as an original matter, the First Amendment only protects verbal communication. As Justice Story noted in his famous commentaries:
It is plum, then, that the language of this amendment imports no more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his fights, person, property, or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.
Justice Scalia makes this same point in his book, A Matter of Interpretation.
This is my understanding of the general boundaries of the historical First Amendment, and I am quite confident that it is the majority view.
Thus, the conduct described in your hypo is clearly protected by the First Amendment.
And by the way, we all have the same Constitution, whether we like it or not.
Collateral Gestapo:
CTA7, that's why it was a HYPO (and intentionally extreme). One of the problems with history (at least the use to which you wish to put it), is that it is reinvented constantly. Remember, for thousands of years, Troy was as mythical as Atlantis. I did not suggest that the framers thought anything of speech, my question was "what if" that was their view. Or more to the point, "so what" if that was their view. There have, for example, been serious assertions that the 1stA was meant by the framers as a bar against prior restraint. Even if "true," i.e., even if you buy that version of the framers' (again, who are the framers?) beliefs, then they were bound by values that I reject and am entitled to reject as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence given the wording of the 1stA. What the framers may have thought may be relevant, it certainly is interesting, but it is not necessary. If we deem it necessary, then what happens when we do not know what they thought (which I think is the situation we are in fact in), or when we do not know their thoughts, or when our perspective of their thoughts is altered, e.g., by finding the new piece of historical evidence, or when we simply disagree as to what they thought? If you give any weight to "original intent" then the discovery I hypothesized in my earlier message would require that we reject much of our present 1stA jurisprudence and give up those illusory rights we mistakenly believed the framers meant to protect. I say to hell with what the framers thought if I can find the right in the Constitution and wish it to be there. Original intent is an empty vessel into which ideologues like Bork pour their own subjective values. Were it otherwise, it would remain at best a ham-fisted attempt to to "objectify" the unalterably subjective.
So I ask again that you respond to the new discovery hypothesized in my earlier post. What result? (as we heard so many times in law school). No one disagrees that this new evidence conclusively establishes the framers' view that the 1stA was to prohibit only legislation concerning oral political advocacy. We are pretending here. What do you do as a USSC judge when I challenge my imprisonment for having praised Marquez?
CTA7:
CG-
Whoops. Sorry about that. It was a little late in the day, and I wasn't sure whether your hypo included/assumed a substantive change in the law.
Assuming that the historical view was that the First Amendment only covered verbal communication, my position would remain the same. We are bound by the original understanding of the text, whether you care for the values of the framers or not. Congress and the States are always free to amend the Constitution. That's why many serious minded liberals are calling for a constitutional convention. They want to overhaul the Constitution to address their values. For the most part, I prefer the values of the framers; but I respect this crowd for their willingness to abide by the process outlined in the Constitution.
Moreover, your "who are the framers?" query is a little overplayed. Although there are unquestionably gray areas of the Constitution, the historical documents actually show a surprising amount of consensus among "framers", as well as those who came shortly after them (e.g., Story), on the meaning of the vast majority of the Constitution's text. Thus, even if a few documents were to surface with contrarian views on the meaning of certain constitutional provisions, I think it is stretching the bounds of hypo land to suggest that any historical discovery will fundamentally change the way we view most of the Constitution's text. Keep in mind that a great deal of our Constitution is derived from the English Bill of Rights and the common law. As I've already noted, a lot of the Constitution's text includes terms of art with hundreds of years of common law behind them.
And as for the gray areas, well that's why judges get paid the big bucks. Sometimes you gotta dig deep and try to glean, as best you can, the meaning of the text. But the fact that it's hard is no excuse for dipping into the penumbra pool. It always amazes me that jurists and so-called scholars who make crap up as they go along, i.e., the "Living Constitution" cognoscenti, are hailed as intellectuals, while originalists are viewed as simple minded. See, e.g., your statement "I say to hell with what the framers thought if I can find the right in the Constitution and wish it to be there."). That's not law, bro. That's anarchy, or, at the very least, rule by judicial fiat. And I am not a fan of that "system". You need to cut down on your Clash CD collection, and try some Toby Keith. Puttin' a boot in a terrorist's ass sounds like fun to me. :)
Finally, where the meaning of constitutional text is less than clear, it should be give a limited interpretation. As Scalia would say, box that beeyatch in. The Constitution was not meant to address every problem or societal ill. Most issues were mean to be left to the States. Ah yes, sweet federalism. But the incorporation doctrine, which I hate with every fiber of my being, and the Seventeenth Amendment (direction election of senators), which I also have little love for, changed everything (for the worse). Now we are ruled by an all powerful federal government (BTW: thanks for the job Uncle Sam), and many times by nine judges, who often impose a one-size-fits-all answer on a country whose regions are strikingly different. I bet federalism sounds a lot better to many of you liberals now that the Federalist Society is running the country (and the world!--sinister laugh). Want to ban guns in California? Have at it. Want abortion on demand in Massachusetts? Go for it. Gay marriage in Vermont. That's not my bag, but hey it's your state. But don't impose your "values" on the states like Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, etc. Let them be. That's the great thing about federalism. It gives the states, and thus the people, the power to experiment at the local level. It promotes competition of ideas and values. Some will win and others will lose. But people will be able to vote with their feet, and that's a system I like. I call it freedom.
[And another gent enters the fray]
Montgomery Burns:
Ok, I just want to get your views straight here. Under your interpretive method, had the 19th Amendment never been passed, and states continued to deprive women of the right to vote, then the federal courts could not use the 14th Amendment, whose text plainly applies: "nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," to strike down laws depriving women of the right to vote, because is no historical evidence that when the framers of the 14th Amendment passed it they meant the equal protection clause to have that application? Why couldn't equal protection guarantee the right? Because a woman was not considered a "person" for the purposes of the clause in the 1860s? You've got to be kidding me.
CTA7:
MB-
O.k., let's keep things simple. Let's assume that the equal protection clause was only meant to apply to men (which, by the way, is probably true). If that is true then no the EPC of the 14th Amend. could not be used to strike down laws depriving women of the right to vote.
Look, all of this may sound radical to you people, but here's a news flash: the Constitution can be amended. Moreover, it is simply not the role of the judiciary to create law, even if the end result serves a noble cause. That is the role of the legislature, be it state or federal.
The fact that I take this position does not mean that I hate women or civil rights. I am against lawlessness.
Collateral Gestapo:
MB, I would pitch in with you on this one, but I am currently serving hard time for lauding the literary works of authors whom the majoritarian branch deems subversive.
CTA7, my problem is with your premise that textaulism and original intent are somehow "objective." I say I find whatever right the language of the Constitution conceivably affords. You say that is not law, it is judicial fiat. Choosing textualism and original intent as interpretive models is, in the first instance, no less a matter of fiat than my choice to do otherwise---they both are choices that lead to predictable outcomes. And we haven't even begun to scrutinize these methods in their application. I understand the comfort folks like you derive from knowing that we are governed by laws and not by men. It is a nice theory. It also has never been true, and by the very nature of humanity (or human-ness), never can be. The results judges reach should be justifiable, but you are dreaming if you think they are achieved by the objective application of big-L "Law" to the facts presented a court (in which case I suggest Bill Gates redirect his energies toward a judicial supercomputer that could save the gov't a helluva lot of money on judge and clerk salaries). We should finish this over a beer, but I think I'm a bit south of you for that.
CTA7:
CG-
I think we will have to finish this debate one day over drinks (perhaps a nice bottle of Southern whiskey). Nevertheless, I will pass along these parting thoughts:
I do believe that originalism, when applied honestly, is an objective method (indeed, the only objective method) of constitutional interpretation. As I have stated before, the framers and the states drafted and ratified the Constitution understanding that the words they used had a certain range of meaning. That meaning can generally be gleaned by looking at the historical documents that the founders/framers used to construct the Constitution. And while it is true that some provisions of the Constitution have less historical support than others, many have a rich history that provides the parameters from which we must operate. These historical documents do not reflect my views on anything, and thus can hardly be categorized as subjective. Is it possible that a radical right wing judge could selectively quote a historical document out of context to support a bastardized view of the First Amendment? Sure. But I am quite confident that such a view would not withstand scrutiny (thanks to smart people like you), and would eventually be cast into the judicial dustbin of history. The problem that I have with your line of argument is that you assume that there is no historical truth when it comes to the Constitution. That may be true in some instances, but in many cases historical documents show that there was a consensus view among the men of that time as to what the Constitution meant. You don't believe that. I do. And therein lies the rub.
I've enjoyed it.
